By Mark Hodgson
In The Haves and the Have Nots I discussed the fact that those nations that (often belatedly) filed their updated NDCs (nationally determined contributions) ahead of COP30 are for the most part insignificant in terms of global greenhouse gas emissions, while those which are very significant have by and large not filed their updated NDCs. The main exception to this is of course the USA, which filed its updated NDC when Joe Biden was still POTUS, but now that he has been replaced by Donald Trump, it will be ignored by the nation that filed it. There has been much talk of China’s pre-COP30 promises, but at the time of writing they haven’t materialised in the form of an updated NDC filed with the UN. Of the world’s largest emitters, assuming we ignore the USA for the reason mentioned above, only Russia has filed its second NDC. The English-language version can be accessed here.
The tone is set early:
The Russian Federation is included in the Annex I of the Convention as a Party to the Convention undergoing the process of transition to a market economy. Guided by the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances, the Russian Federation makes consistent and increasingly ambitious efforts to achieve the long-term global temperature goal in accordance with Article 2 of the Paris Agreement.
As part of the Paris Agreement implementation, the Russian Federation announces a target for limiting greenhouse gas emissions by 2035 to 65-67% compared to 1990 levels, which provides for taking into account the maximum possible absorptive capacity of forests and other natural ecosystems, and subject to sustainable and balanced socio-economic development of the Russian Federation, as well as to its non-discriminatory access to the equipment and technologies, necessary to reduce (mitigate) greenhouse gas emissions and/or increase their removals.
1990, of course, is a very convenient base year for the Russian Federation, because it was broadly the year when emissions within the Soviet Union and its satellite states in eastern Europe peaked, before collapsing along with their economies when the USSR broke up. According to the European Commission’s Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR), the Russian Federation’s emissions look like this:
3055.88 Mton CO2eq (1990)
2084.35 Mton CO2eq (2000)
2575.65 Mton CO2eq (2024)
67% of 3055.88 = 2047.44, so Russia’s “promise” offers no more than to return its emissions to just less than 2000 levels. I put the word “promise” in inverted commas because of the massive caveats contained in its second NDC. Despite being one of the world’s leading nuclear powers, which is currently waging a massive war against its neighbour, Ukraine, it seeks to rely on “the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances”. That is a card that is normally played by the world’s poorest developing countries to justify minimal efforts predicated on massive funding from developed countries. The Russian Federation also, in offering its modest target, relies on “taking into account the maximum possible absorptive capacity of forests and other natural ecosystems”. Finally, it’s also conditional on “sustainable and balanced socio-economic development of the Russian Federation, as well as to its non-discriminatory access to the equipment and technologies, necessary to reduce (mitigate) greenhouse gas emissions and/or increase their removals.” In other words, if its economy isn’t doing well – forget it. Also, if it isn’t offered access to any new technology that will assist in hitting the targets, on the same terms as developing nations are given such access, then again – forget it. It is upset that since invading Ukraine, NATO hasn’t played nicely with it and its economy has suffered, and it complains of “…external negative factors since 2022, such as unilateral measures and sanctions, blocking the access to foreign equipment, technology and capital markets.”
It makes a big thing about its huge resources in the form of forestry which are a brilliant carbon sink, then says it won’t allow the Paris Agreement to constrain its economy:
The Russian Federation finds it unacceptable to use the Paris Agreement and its mechanisms as a tool to create barriers to sustainable socio-economic development of the Convention Parties.
It’s also not prepared to suffer just because its a major fossil fuel supplier:
The Russian Federation considers it essential that situation of countries, particularly developing countries, with economies that are vulnerable to the adverse effects of the implementation of measures to respond to climate change, is taken into consideration in the implementation of commitments under the Convention and the Paris Agreement. This applies notably to countries with economies that are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export, and/or consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products, and/or such use of fossil fuels, which creates serious difficulties in switching to alternatives.
It claims that its second NDC is more ambitious than its first, but only a creative accountant (or Mr Putin) could make that claim. It says (apparently with a straight face) that the first NDC “provides for a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by up to 70% by 2030 relative to the 1990 level”, while the second “provides for a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions to 65–67% compared to the 1990 levels by 2035”. Can you spot the greater ambition? Going a further 3-5% but over a further five years!
Then it complains about the uncertainties it faces, largely because (although it doesn’t say this, of course) of sanctions against it following its invasion of Ukraine:
In addition to the need to ensure sustainable socio-economic development, the Russian Federation, the first country in the world by total area, located in multiple climatic zones, is currently facing barriers and external economic constraints, such as restrictions in access to foreign equipment, technologies, services, capital and carbon markets.
It makes a big play of claiming that as of 2024, about 37% of electricity generation in Russia is low carbon, but this is almost entirely nuclear (11.2%) and hydro (20.8%). Interestingly, only 2% is generated by wind and solar. [By the way, that adds up to 34%, so “about 37%” is very much “about”]. Gas and coal between them generated 65.4% of Russia’s electricity last year.
In what may or may not be a calculated nose-thumbing to western “greens” it proudly claims that it is implementing a technology to facilitate injection of CO2 “into the aquifers intended to enhance oil recovery factor”.
In fairness it does list a number of fairly modest measures aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. I don’t list them here, but I do mention them in the interests of balance. When it comes to adaptation measures, I particularly like “planting wind- and frost-resistant trees and shrubs that provide dense foliage”.
We are also told that:
The Russian Federation actively pursuits [sic] global efforts to address climate change and acts as a full-fledged participant of the international climate dialogue.
It then lists the large number of international agreements to which it is a party, and its involvement with the United Nations in seeking to mitigate climate change and assist developing countries. Which might be pretty virtuous if it wasn’t for the great big elephant in the room – its invasion of its southern neighbour and constant waging of war against it, in a major breach of international law.
